经济学代写

经济学Economics是研究商品和服务的生产、分配和消费的社会科学。 经济学Economics的重点是经济主体的行为和互动，以及经济如何运作。

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经济学Economics essay代写

经济–来自希腊语οἶκος，”家庭”，也可理解为 “家庭用品”，以及νόμος（nomos）”规范 “或 “法律”–既指在实施时为了最好地满足个人或集体需求而对稀缺（有限或有限）资源的使用组织（形式意义），也指保证这种组织的互动系统（实质意义），这一系统也称为经济系统。通常情况下，主体（也称为 “代理人 “或 “行动者 “或经济 “经营者”）被认为是在特定领土内活动；然而，与在领土外活动的其他主体的互动也被考虑在内。

微观经济学Microeconomics

微观经济学是主流经济学的一个分支，研究个人和公司在做出有关稀缺资源分配的决策时的行为以及这些个人和公司之间的互动。微观经济学侧重于研究单个市场、部门或行业，而不是宏观经济学所研究的整个国民经济。

宏观经济学Macroeconomics

宏观经济学是经济科学的一个分支，在总体水平上研究经济，即它涉及整个国家或超国家实体的经济结构和经济表现。它与微观经济学相对立。

供应和需求Supply and demand

在经济学中，供应和需求意味着商品或服务的买卖。买卖在市场上进行，供需数量决定价格。这两个概念在微观经济学和宏观经济学中都有使用。

其他相关科目课程代写：

  • 企业理论 Theory of the firm
  • 信息经济学 Information economics
  • 博弈论 Game theory
  • 金融经济学 Financial economics
  • 市场失灵 Market failure

经济学Economics的研究项目范围

经济学研究稀缺资源在人们之间的分配–研究哪些商品和服务最终落入哪些人手中。为什么是稀缺资源？如果没有稀缺性，就不存在重要的分配问题。经济学家研究了所有实用的，以及许多不实用的分配稀缺资源的手段。市场是分配资源的一个重要手段，所以经济学家研究市场。市场包括像纽约证券交易所这样的股票市场，像芝加哥商品交易所这样的商品市场，也包括农民市场，像佳士得或苏富比这样的拍卖市场（在电影中因人们刮鼻子而无意中购买了一个明朝花瓶而闻名）或eBay，或更多的短暂市场，如你附近的音乐CD市场。此外，商品和服务（属于稀缺资源）由政府分配，使用税收作为获得物品的手段。政府可能被一个政治过程所控制，而对政治的分配的研究，也就是所谓的政治经济学，是经济学的一个重要分支。商品通过某些手段进行分配，如偷窃，被政府认为是非法的，这种分配方法仍然属于经济分析的范畴；

生物代写 | biology essay写作服务 专业团队

Economic reasoning is rather easy to satirize. One might want to know, for instance, the effect of a policy change-a government program to educate unemployed workers, an increase in military spending, or an enhanced environmental regulation – will be on people and their ability to purchase the goods and services they desire. Unfortunately, a single change may have multiple effects. As an absurd and tortured example, government production of helium for (allegedly) military purposes reduces the cost of children’s birthday balloons, causing substitution away from party hats and hired clowns. The reduction in demand for clowns reduces clowns’ wages and thus reduces the costs of running a circus. This cost reduction increases the number of circuses, thereby forcing zoos to lower admission fees to compete with circuses. Thus, were the government to stop subsidizing the manufacture of helium, the admission fee of zoos would likely rise, even though zoos use no helium. This example is superficially reasonable, although the effects are miniscule.

经济学Economics 课后作业代写

问题 1.

Two people are involved in a dispute. Person 1 does not know whether person 2 is strong or weak; they assign probability $\alpha$ to person 2’s being strong. Person 2 is fully informed. Each person can either fight or yield. Each person’s preferences are represented by the payoff function that assigns the payoff of 0 if they yield (regardless of what the other player chooses) and payoff of 1 if they fight and the opponent yields. If they both fights, payoffs are given by $(-1,1)$ if person 2 is strong and $(1,-1)$ if person 2 is weak.

Find the Bayesian Nash equilibria if :
i. $\alpha<1 / 2$

证明 .

Solution. First, consider P1 plays a pure strategy. Suppose P1 plays F. P2’s best response is FY. Compare utilities of $F, Y$ for $P 1$ in response to $F Y$ to see whether $F$ is also a best response to FY.
$$
\begin{aligned}
&u_{1}(F, F Y)=\alpha(-1)+(1-\alpha) 1=1-2 \alpha \
&u_{1}(Y, F Y)=\alpha 0+(1-\alpha) 0=0
\end{aligned}
$$
Since $\alpha<\frac{1}{2}$, we observe $u_{1}(F, F Y)>u_{1}(Y, F Y)$. Therefore P1’s best response to $F Y$ is also $F$. We conclude $(F, F Y)$ is a BNE as it is a mutual best response for both players in the Bayesian Game. Now, suppose P1 plays Y. P2’s best response is FF Compare utilities of F and Y for P1 in response to $F F$ to see whether $Y$ is also a best response to FF.
$$
\begin{aligned}
&u_{1}(F, F F)=\alpha(-1)+(1-\alpha) 1=1-2 \alpha \
&u_{1}(Y, F F)=\alpha 0+(1-\alpha) 0=0
\end{aligned}
$$
We observe P1’s best response is F. Thus there is no mutual best response where P1 plays Y. Now, we consider P1 playing a mixed strategy. Suppose P1 plays $\sigma_{1}$ such that $\sigma_{1}(F)=p, p \in(0,1)$.


We already showed P1’s best response is a pure strategy to both $F F$ and $F Y$. Thus we consider $p=\frac{1}{2}$ and P2 mixes $\sigma_{2}$ between FF with probability $q$ and FY with probability $1-q$. We compare payoffs for player 1 :
$$
\begin{aligned}
&u_{1}\left(F, \sigma_{2}\right)=\alpha[q(-1)+(1-q)(1)]+(1-\alpha)[q(1)+(1-q)(1)]=1-2 q \alpha \
&u_{1}\left(Y, \sigma_{2}\right)=0
\end{aligned}
$$
We assumed P1 mixes with $p$. This can be true if and only if $u_{1}\left(F, \sigma_{2}\right)=u_{1}\left(Y, \sigma_{2}\right)$. (i.e. P1 is indifferent between playing F and $Y$ ). Thus it must be $q=\frac{1}{2 \alpha}$. But since $\alpha<\frac{1}{2}$ implies $q>1$, this is a contradiction and we can’t have a BNE in mixed strategies for this case. We conclude the only BNE of this case is $(F, F Y)$

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